This paper examines the role of search frictions in convertible bond pricing. Using a sample of 641 Rule 144-A issues of convertible bonds for the period 1996 through 2007, we examine two channels through which search frictions might impact pricing: the ease of attracting initial investors to the issue and expected aftermarket liquidity. We document a robust negative relationship between bond underpricing at issue and investors' participation in prior bond issues by the investment bank. We also find a strong negative relationship between bond underpricing and proxies for aftermarket liquidity. Taken together, our findings suggest that search frictions play a meaningful role in bond pricing and that intermediaries can add value through repeated interactions with investors. This is in contrast to conflict of interest hypotheses, in which banks use underpricing to reward favored clients.
I. Introduction
Why do firms issue convertible bonds at discounts relative to their fundamental values?
Although underpricing of initial issues of convertible bonds is substantial (for example, Chan and Chen (2007) report initial underpricing of 9.3%), we know relatively little about its determinants. This paper combines data on investor allocations in Rule 144-A convertible bond issues with estimates of underpricing to examine the role of search frictions in the initial pricing of intermediate securities. In particular, we identify two distinct frictions: the ease of attracting initial investors to the issue and expected aftermarket liquidity. The primary aim of the paper is to document the relationship between these frictions and initial underpricing.
The 144-A market has become an important source of convertible bond financing (see Gomes and Phillips (2008) ). Unlike public new issues, corporations choosing to issue bonds in the 144-A market are able to delay or avoid the registration of securities. 1 A major benefit to issuers of Rule 144-A is the increased speed at which transactions are completed. They are also able to save resources that would have been allocated to the registration process in a public offering. The costs to the issuer of Rule 144-A offerings come from the fact that the bonds can be sold only to qualified institutional buyers (QIBs) who, in turn, can only make secondary market trades in the bonds with other QIBs. All else equal, Rule 144-A bond markets are less liquid than public markets since participation is restricted and transactions take place in over-thecounter markets. Trading in these bonds is often described by practitioners as "by appointment only."
The growing importance of the 144-A market, along with the availability of information regarding the identities of the QIBs participating in initial issues makes this market particularly useful for examining the roles of bank-investor linkages and after market liquidity in security pricing. Sagient Research's Placement Tracker database allows us to observe repeated interactions between investment bankers (placement agents) and Rule 144-A convertible bond investors. We use these data, along with our estimate of a theoretical bond price at issue, to measure the extent to which underwriter-investor relationships and aftermarket liquidity impact initial underpricing.
There is a substantial body of research investigating the impact of liquidity on asset prices. Amihud and Mendelson (2006) survey this literature and report evidence that illiquidity depresses prices (in both stock and bond markets). Amihud and Mendelson (2006) divide liquidity costs into three categories: price impact costs, search and delay costs, and direct trading costs. Our focus on the second category, search and delay frictions, is motivated in part by Duffie, Garleanu, and Pedersen (2005) . The authors develop a theoretical model relating searchand-bargaining frictions, bid-ask spreads and prices in over-the-counter markets. Specifically, their model suggests greater liquidity discounts when counterparties are harder to find, sellers have less bargaining power, and there are fewer qualified owners.
In the context of Rule 144-A convertible bonds, we identify two types of search and delay frictions. The first is the ability to find buyers in the secondary market should an initial investor wish to trade the bond. The second measure, the fraction of bond investors that are the investment bank's repeat investors (i.e., they have participated in prior 144-A issues placed by the same investment bank), is intended to capture the ease of attracting investors. The idea is that repeat investors may provide a reduction of the bargaining complexities that can exist in efforts to place initial security issues with unfamiliar investors. Reducing both of these types of search and delay frictions is hypothesized to result in less initial underpricing. Ritter and Welch (2002) describe investor allocation, including the question of who receives allocations and how allocations relate to other business provided by the investor as, "the most interesting open questions today… [u] nfortunately, not only do the answers to these questions depend upon the sample period, but underwriters also usually guard information about the specifics of their share allocations, posing significant challenges to empiricists." (p. 1796).
Historically, the lack of information on investor allocation has posed a major empirical challenge, even in the voluminous initial public offering (IPO) literature, with the exception of a handful of studies that use proprietary allocation data over short time horizons (e.g., Cornelli and Goldreich (2001) ; Aggarwal, Puri and Prabahala (2002) and Aggarwal (2003) ). The investor identity data disclosed in 144-A markets provides an opportunity to shed some light on questions regarding the importance of relationships and prior business with the placement agent in initial pricing.
How should repeated interactions between placement agents and investors impact underpricing? We identify two opposing forces: (1) Conflict of interest (e.g., Benveniste and Spindt (1989) , in which underwriters compensate favored investors with more underpriced issues; or Baron (1982) , in which underpricing allows a reduction in distribution effort) and (2) Search costs/frictions, in which the costs of placing a bond with a familiar investor are low. This would result in less aggressive bond pricing (i.e., lower underpricing). To our knowledge, this is the first study to attempt to identify and disentangle these two potential effects.
Convertible bonds provide a useful laboratory for examining the determinants of underpricing of intermediated securities, outside of more traditional IPO settings, for several reasons. First, convertible bonds are considerably underpriced at issue. We estimate that the bonds in our sample of 641 issues over a 12-year horizon are issued at a discount of 7.15% relative to fundamental value. Second, we expect asymmetric information and uncertainty about fundamental value to be less severe in these markets, since our sample of issuers already have publicly traded stock. This makes it easier to identify the potential impact of liquidity and search frictions on pricing. Similarly, the potential impact of the issue on monitoring or managerial entrenchment (see e.g., Meidan (2007) for an examination of these determinants in the private issue of public equity (PIPE) setting) is also less important for convertible bonds than with equity issues. Convertible bonds have downside protection, decreasing monitoring incentives relative to the case of straight equity. Moreover, ownership does not change at issue, so managerial entrenchment is less likely to be altered by the issue.
This paper provides a number of new results in the literature on the initial pricing of securities and of convertible bonds in particular. The first of the two most important findings is that underpricing is negatively and significantly to the relationship between the underwriter and investors. That is, when investors are the placement agent's repeat customers, convertible bond prices are higher. This result contrasts the hypotheses regarding bankers using underpricing to reward repeat investors but is consistent with findings in Ljungqvist, Jenkinson, and Wilhelm (2003) , who report that a reduction in underpricing for foreign firms that choose to go public in the United States via the book building method. They estimate that this benefit outweighs the fees charged by U.S. investment banks. The second key finding is that when bankers place bonds in the hands of investors with which they conduct repeat business (on both the intensive and extensive margins), issuer fees are significantly reduced. Taken together, these findings suggest that the benefits (to the issuer) of the investment bank and investor relationship outweigh potential conflict of interest costs associated with repeated interaction between investors and investment banks. This paper is organized as follows: Section II provides a discussion of related literature; Section III presents the data and framework for empirical analysis; Section III discusses the empirical results; Section IV concludes.
II. Related Literature
Our paper is related to three main strands of literature: IPO and SEO underpricing; the role of relationships in finance; and convertible bond underpricing.
IPO Underpricing
This paper is closely related to the substantial body of research on IPO underpricing.
The predicted determinants of underpricing in the IPO literature fall into three primary categories: asymmetric information (e.g., asymmetrically informed investors as in Rock (1986) or compensating informed investors in the bookbuilding process as in Benveniste and Spindt (1989) ); moral hazard (conflict of interest in which underpricing is a way to reduce distribution effort as in Baron (1982) ); and underwriter price support, as in Ellis, Michaely and O'Hara (2000) . See Ritter and Welch (2002) and Ljungqvist (2007) for excellent surveys. We rely on this literature in identifying control variables in our analysis of the role of search frictions and aftermarket liquidity in the initial pricing of convertible bonds.
The expected relationship between liquidity risk and asset prices has been an important focus of the microstructure and asset pricing literature since Amihud and Mendelson (1986). 2 However, only recently have after-market liquidity and liquidity risk received attention in the IPO underpricing literature. Ellul and Pagano (2006) develop and test a model in which aftermarket liquidity and liquidity risk impact IPO underpricing. Our paper complements theirs in that we attempt to capture a new aspect of liquidity -the ease of attracting initial investors -in addition to examining the role of after-market liquidity. Our analysis also focuses on a different market (convertible bonds), is based on a larger sample (641 versus 347 new equity issues in their study) and is estimated over a longer time period. Reuter (2006) is the only paper to our knowledge that quantifies the correlation of security pricing and business relationships between investment banks and investors. Like Ellul and Pagano (2006) , he focuses on IPO markets. Because it is generally not possible to observe initial allocations of IPOs, Reuter (2006) uses mutual fund holdings during the quarter of the IPO as a proxy for IPO allocations. He links these holdings to fees and trade commissions paid by funds to the IPO underwriters and reports that business relationships with underwriters lead to greater and more favorable IPO allocations. While Reuter (2006) is closely related to ours in that it makes use of a relationship measure, the benefit of the 144-A data that we use is that we are able to observe directly the investor allocations, as well as prior links between investors and investment bankers. Interestingly, our conclusions are different from those in Reuter (2006) in that we find that links between investors and banks actually improve pricing.
SEO Underpricing
Underpricing is not unique to IPOs. There is evidence that seasoned equity is also priced at a discount relative to fundamental value. For example, Corwin (2003) reports SEO underpricing of 1.92% in the 1980s and 2.92% in the 1990s. For an extended discussion of the literature on seasoned equity underpricing, see the survey article by Eckbo, Masulis and Norli (2007) .
It is important to note that because bonds are infrequently traded, the measure of underpricing that we use differs from both the IPO and SEO underpricing measures. 3 We estimate a theoretical bond price and measure the deviation of the offer price from this model implied value.
Relationships and Conflict of Interest in Finance
Do search costs (for investors) drive underpricing? Or does conflict of interest, in particular the incentive to reward repeat customers with more underpriced issues, dominate?
The empirical strategy employed in this paper allows us to test the Benveniste and Spindt (1989) hypothesis that underwriters use underpricing to reward favored investors. While the setting for their model is the IPO market, the same mechanism might be expected to contribute to underpricing in convertible bonds. If, on the other hand, having relationships with investors reduces a placement agent's search costs in distributing an issue, they will not need to rely as much on aggressive pricing to attract investor interest. The dominant effect of a placement agent's use of her "rolodex" on initial bond pricing is an empirical question.
There is a small empirical literature in finance that attempts to measure relationships. A particularly relevant paper in our context is Cornelli and Goldreich (2001) , in which the authors analyze the full books of demand in 39 international IPOs. They find that favorable allocations and pricing occurs when there are relationships between investment banks and investors. In their setting investment banks' "friends" are defined as investors who often bid large quantities and (alternatively) as those who obtain large allocations. Our study is related to theirs in which we track links between banks and investors; however, our main focus is on the determinants of underpricing rather than on the book building process and subsequent allocation. 4
In choosing a relationship measure, we take a very simple approach: we calculate the fraction of investors in a particular issue that have purchased a new 144a issue by the same placement agent in the past year, relative to all investors in the issue. While in very different settings than ours, Cohen, Frazzini and Malloy (2009) , Davis and Kim (2007) and Mehran and Stulz (2007) also focus on economic implications of investor relationships and construct similar variables to estimate these links. 5
Convertible Bond Underpricing
Despite the size and importance of the convertible bond market, there have been very few studies of the determinants of pricing in these markets, with the exception of evidence in Chan and Chen (2007) , who link convertible bond ratings to initial underpricing. 6 They find initial underpricing of magnitudes similar to ours and they report that prices converge to fundamental value within two years with a shorter seasoning period for high rated bonds. 7
The main contribution in Chan and Chen (2007) is a test of the hypothesis that covenant renegotiation risk explains underpricing. The proxy that they use for renegotiation risk is bond rating and they find evidence of higher underpricing in low rated bonds. 8 Although our focus is 4 We do not observe investor bids. 5 Hochberg, Ljungqvist and Lu (2007) and Guedj and Barnea (2009) use graph theory and tools from sociology to measure social ties of investors and directors, respectively; however, the main aim in these papers is to capture "centrality" with less emphasis on simple "connectedness," which is our primary objective. 6 3B in 1996, $34.3B in 2001, $35.3B in 2007. 7 See also Henderson (2006) for convertible bond underpricing estimates. 8 Cai, Helwege and Warga (2007) examine 421 straight bond initial public offerings and report statistically significant underpricing, especially in issues for which information asymmetry is high and rating low. Chen, very different from theirs, in light of their results, we include bond rating as a control for expected renegotiation risk in all regression specifications.
III. Empirical Framework

Variable Construction
The first step in the analysis involves calculating convertible bond underpricing. Unlike the IPO and SEO after-markets, bonds trade infrequently, making first-day returns difficult to measure. To quantify pricing in the new issues market, we compute the premium of the estimated bond value over the offering price. This measure is defined as: The historical return volatility, σ, for each convertible bond issuer's stock is the standard deviation of daily historical stock returns during trading days -160 through -20 days prior to issuance. 9 The default intensity, λ, is inferred from credit spreads at the time of the offering.
Specifically, with an implied recovery rate R, the implied default intensity is:
r c is the yield on straight bonds with the same credit yield as the issue; r f is the risk-free yield; and R is the fraction of par expected to be recovered in the event of default. For convertible bonds that are not rated, we assume each issue is BBB rated. 10 We use 40% as the anticipated recovery rate based on historical recovery rates from Moody's.
The probability of the up-and down-steps, p u and p d , respectively, are computed as:
where the parameter q is the continuously compounded dividend rate, estimated as the trailing 12-month dividend rate on the issuer's stock.
Construction of the convertible bond tree follows from the stock tree. Starting at the terminal node, corresponding to the final maturity date of the bond, the price of the bond is set equal to the maximum of the conversion value (conversion ratio times the stock tree price) or the par value of the bond. Specifically, the expiration date T value of the i th convertible bond in the sample is: P i,T = MAX[PAR, CR i x S i,T ], where CR i is the conversion ratio, and S i,T designates the issuer's stock price at terminal node T.
The prior nodes on the tree are populated by working backwards. Starting with the time-step immediately prior to expiration, the value of the bond is the maximum of the discounted expected payoff and the conversion value.
Specifically, ,
), ]
We use call and put schedules compiled from SDC and Bloomberg for each bond and assume that these options are exercised optimally. 11
Data and Summary Statistics
Our initial sample of 144-A convertible bond offerings is based on Sagient's Placement
Tracker database for the years 1996 through 2007. 12 These data include placement agent and investor name, the allocations to each individual investor and a description of the investor type (e.g., mutual fund, hedge fund, pension fund, etc). There are 1,176 unique 144A convertible bond issues in the database.
To obtain issue characteristics, we match the Sagient bonds with convertible bond offerings in the Securities Data Corporation New Issues database (SDC), based on ticker, name and closing date of the issue. When we are unable to obtain a match in the SDC database, we match with bond issue data from Bloomberg. We exclude: all exchangeable and mandatory issues; issues with floating conversion prices; and any issues that are missing important terms, such as the coupon rate or conversion ratio. After filtering, we obtain underpricing estimates for 847 bonds. We further require data all explanatory variables of interest, leaving a final sample of 641 issues. 13 There are 62 unique placement agents and 3269 unique investor names in the sample.
The Placement Tracker data have been used in recent studies of the impact of investor type in private issues of public equity (PIPES). These studies have examined the role of investor type on future equity price performance (Brophy, Ouimet and Sialm, 2009 ) and on the pricing of PIPES (Median, 2007) . These papers differ substantially in focus from ours in that the focus is on investor type (e.g., hedge funds versus pension funds) rather than investor identity and they also do not examine convertible bond underpricing, mainly due to the unobservability of the "fundamental prices." We circumvent this problem by estimating a theoretical at issue price. Table 1 presents summary statistics for the variables used in the analysis. We observe substantial underpricing at issue. The mean (median) discount relative to fundamental value of the 144-A convertible bonds at issue is sizeable, at -7.2% (-5.8%). This is similar to the magnitudes reported in prior studies of convertible bond underpricing (e.g., Henderson (2006) and Chen and Chan (2007)). While this suggests that convertible bonds are underpriced on average, this variable exhibits significant variation, with an interquartile range of -14.2% to 1.3%.
Similar variation is seen in the first day returns of IPOs (see e.g., Ritter (2009) It is important to note that we observe only those investors in 144-A issues that choose to be named (they must do so if they plan to sell the bond at some point in the future). The mean (median) fraction of issues bought by unnamed investors is 30.9 (19.7) percent in the Sagient Data. We exclude unnamed investors in counting the number of investors. This helps with interpreting the aftermarket liquidity proxy, as we would like a measure of investors that intend to trade the bond. We do not expect the unnamed investor group to create bias in the estimated relationship between the repeated interaction measure and underpricing since we do not have reason to believe that named investors are more or less likely to be related to the placement agent than unidentified ones.
The Sagient data include announcement dates for 144-A issues during the later years of the sample (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) . There are 337 bonds in the subsample for which we have announcement dates. We calculate cumulative abnormal returns (equity return minus the CRSP value-weighted return) for days -1 to +1 relative to the announcement date and observe a significant negative abnormal return of -2.9 percent. In extended analysis intended to aid in the interpretation of the underpricing measure, we will test whether underpricing is significantly related to the equity price response to the bond issue.
due to the fact that 36 percent of the bonds are purchased by investors with missing investor type information in the Sagient database (these are labeled "Unknown" in the database).
The sample of issuers has broad industry representation, as shown in Table 1 , Panel B.
The most common industries of issuers are communications (15%), consumer non-cyclical (30%), and technology (17%). however, we estimate all regressions with year fixed effects.
We control for asymmetric information by including an analyst following measure, NumAnalysts, as a proxy for (low) asymmetric information. The firms in the sample tend to have analyst coverage, with a mean analyst following of 16.9; however, there is substantial variation, as
NumAnalysts has a standard deviation of 11.2. We also control for issue size (GrossProceeds). The average (median) issue size was over $286 ($180) million while the smallest and largest issues were $10 million and $2.8 billion respectively. Ellis, Michaely and O'Hara (2000) find that underpricing is significantly related to postissuance trading activity by underwriters. Due to data limitations, we are unable test this price support hypothesis directly; however, we were able to obtain market maker trading activity for a small sample of 144-A convertible bond issues by Nasdaq firms (24) Correlations Table 2 provides a correlation matrix of the key variables used in the analysis. From the table, observe that bonds are issued at higher prices relative to fundamental value when: issues are larger; there are more investors in the issue; and the fraction of repeat investors relative to all investors is high. Bonds are priced lower relative to fundamental value when: placement agent fees are high and when there is more "buyer power" in a given deal (the proxy for buyer power is deal HHI, the sum of squared shares of the issue bought by individual investors). We also observe a positive relationship between price relative to fundamental value and shareholder wealth effects (CAR) at the announcement of a bond issue. The regression analyses given below will shed more concrete light on these univariate relationships.
Empirical Specification
The main empirical specification is as follows:
Underpricing is the discount (premium) of the issue price relative to fundamental value. Recall that when this variable is negative, the interpretation is that the bond is underpriced. The number of investors in the issue, NumInvestors, is a proxy for after-market liquidity and is intended to capture the number of potential investors in the after market. We expect β 1 , the estimated coefficient NumInvestors, to be positive. This hypothesis is consistent with the models of Pedersen (2005, 2007) where more potential investors lead to higher prices. There is some evidence in the literature that liquidity is an important determinant of pricing in the 144-A market for already-issued (rather than new) securities. Chaplinsky and Ramchand (2004) find that the yield on Rule 144-A corporate bonds is 0.49% higher than on unrestricted bonds with similar characteristics. Although this evidence comes from seasoned corporate bonds and includes straight bonds, it highlights the potential importance of liquidity in corporate bond markets and in 144-A bond markets in particular.
RepeatInvestors, defined as the fraction of investors that have purchased a new 144a issue from issue i's placement agent during the past year, is the proxy for the ease of finding initial investors. If search costs are reduced by attracting familiar investors, then aggressive bond pricing can be avoided and we would expect to observe higher bond prices relative to fundamental value. That is, we would expect β 2 >0. If on the other hand, if conflict of interest dominates (rewarding repeat customers with more underpriced issues as in Benveniste and Spindt (1989) or underwriter information as in Baron (1982) ), then this variable will be negatively related to cost relative to fundamental value (β 2 <0).
Additionally, we include the vector X comprised of the following control variables: bond rating; (log) issue size (GrossProceeds); number of equity analysts covering the firm (NumAnalysts) and underwriter fees (Fees (2007), we expect all coefficients on the ratings dummies as well as
the Junk variable to be negative. We also expect the RateB coefficient to be less than RateC.
GrossProceeds and NumAnalysts are included to control for information asymmetry at the issue and firm level, respectively. These are included based on prior findings that new issue underpricing is positively and significantly related to information asymmetry. Fees are included to test hypotheses regarding potential substitution between fees and underpricing. If there is substitution then we would expect higher fees in bonds that are priced higher relative to fundamental value.
IV. Results
What Drives Underpricing? Table 3 shows results of OLS regressions in which Underpricing is the dependent variable.
Column 1 of Table 3 shows the baseline regression in which the bond ratings measures are the only explanatory variables (these are in X in Equation 1). This is based on Chan and Chen (2007), who use credit rating as a proxy for renegotiation risk to examine the hypothesis that convertible bond underpricing is due to the possibility of covenant renegotiation. Findings in Chen (2007) in that they also find higher initial underpricing for Baa1, Baa2, Baa3 and Ba1 bonds than they do for Ba2 bonds (see Chan and Chen (2007) , Table 1 , in which these pricing error relative to fundamental values are estimated to be -8.78, -8.74, -7.17, -7.47 and -6.25, respectively).
Column 2 of Table 3 provides the main results of our analysis. The regression specification includes the two search frictions proxies, as well as proxies for information asymmetry and bond rating controls. The main result is that both dimensions of liquidity matter.
That is, we observe positive and significant relationships between both the number of investors in the issue (the proxy for after-market liquidity), as well as the fraction of investors who are the placement agent's repeat customers (the proxy for the ease with which the placement agent attracts investors). Recall, the mean convertible bond discount relative to fundamental value is 7.1%. All else equal, a one standard deviation increase in the number of investors from its mean results in an increase of price relative to fundamental value of 1.02%. A one standard deviation increase in the fraction of repeat investors results in an increase of price relative to fundamental value of 2.1%.
Consistent with the information asymmetry findings in the IPO literature, the results in Table 3 (Column 2) show a positive and significant role for reduced information asymmetry in bond pricing. That is, the estimated coefficient on NumAnalyst is positive and significant. In addition, we find that high Fees are associated with more underpricing. Taken together, the findings in Table 3 (Column 2) suggest that search frictions play a meaningful role in bond pricing and that intermediaries can add value through their repeated interactions with investors. This is in contrast to conflict of interest hypotheses, in which banks use underpricing to reward favored clients.
An alternative interpretation for the positive and significant coefficient on the number of investors measure (NumInvestors) is that this variable proxies for investor interest in the deal, rather than secondary market liquidity. In extended regressions we add a debt maturity measure (Maturity) as an additional proxy for after market liquidity. The basic idea is that as the maturity of the issue becomes longer, short-horizon investors will be less attracted to the bond due to concerns about the ability to sell the bond in the after market. For example, Amihud and Mendelson (1991) find that the yields on shorter maturity treasuries are substantially smaller than on less liquid long-maturity treasuries. The results of this regression are in Table 3 , Column 3.
We find that debt maturity is negatively and significantly related to Underpricing. That is, longer maturity bonds are priced lower relative to fundamental value. Even if the interpretation of NumInvestors as a proxy for investor interest is valid, the Maturity results suggest a positive role for after-market liquidity in bond pricing. Moreover, the significant and positive coefficient on the related investors measure (RepeatInvestor) provides strong evidence that investor base is an important determinant of pricing.
In addition to adding the Maturity measure to the extended analysis presented in Table 3 (Column 3), we also include an investor buyer power (HHI) measure and a leverage variable (DebtRatio). The HHI measure captures the concentration of investor allocation within an issue.
If buyer power matters, we expect that issues in which buyer power is high (high HHI) will be more underpriced. That is, we expect to observe a negative relationship between Underpricing and HHI. We include a DebtRatio control variable based on the idea that issuers that already have large amounts of debt outstanding may be forced to issue convertible bonds with less favorable terms. We find that the buyer power measure is insignificant after controlling for prior relationships and the number of investors in the deal (HHI is significantly related to underpricing in the univariate correlations in Table 2 ). Not surprisingly, the estimated coefficient on the DebtRatio variable is negative and significant. That is, we observe lower prices relative to fundamental value when firms have larger debt to equity ratios. This suggests that firms that already have high leverage difficulties placing new debt.
Potential Endogeneity of Fees
It is possible that investment banks set fees and determine bond pricing simultaneously.
To account for the potential endogeneity of fees, we use the two-stage-least squares procedure to estimate the following system of equations: Results of estimation are presented in Table 4 . The Underpricing results are in Table 4 , Panel A and are very similar to the findings in the Table 3 extended regressions except that Fee is no longer significant. The Fee equation results are in Table 4 , Panel B. We find that the fees charged by banks are lower when there are more related investors and when investors are active in a placement agent's prior bond issues. We also find lower percentage fees for larger bond issues, and higher percentage fees when bonds are priced favorably. The latter finding is consistent with banks charging fees as compensation for obtaining high prices for the bonds in the 144-A markets; however, the finding that relationships decrease fees is consistent with a reduction of search costs that is transferred to firms. Taken together, the results provide strong evidence that a placement agent's relationships improve pricing of an issuer's bonds. This is contrary to the conflict of interest hypothesis, but consistent with models of search costs and friction. 17
Underpricing: Costly to Equity-Holders?
As shown in Table 1 , convertible bonds are priced at approximately 7.2% lower than fundamental value. A natural question to ask is whether this is optimal from the perspective of the firm. For example, in the theoretical IPO literature, underpricing can be an optimal solution to an asymmetric information problem (e.g., the winner's curse as in Rock (1986) ). The main finding in this paper is that both liquidity and search costs explain bond underpricing, even after controlling for asymmetric information and other determinants of underpricing from the literature. Given our findings, should issuers seek to reduce underpricing in their bonds by identifying placement agents that can attract large numbers of repeat investors? One way to address this question is to examine the link between underpricing and equity market returns near convertible bond announcements.
Using convertible bond announcement dates provided in Sagient for the years 2003 through 2007, we examine the relationship between abnormal equity returns at the time of convertible bond announcement and convertible bond underpricing. If underpricing is a costly signal of a firm's high value, we would expect to see a negative relationship between the Underpricing variable and stock returns at the time of the bond issue (i.e., higher equity price response if prices are priced lower than fundamental value). If, on the other hand, underpricing is due to costly frictions such as illiquidity or search costs in markets, we expect that underpricing is costly to the firm. That is, we would observe a positive relationship between the price relative to fundamental value and abnormal returns at announcement. 18
The summary statistics in Table 1 show that equity returns decline by more than 2.9 percent at announcements of convertible bond issues. If underpricing reflects reactions to market frictions (such as illiquidity and search costs), then we would expect higher equity prices when bonds are priced higher relative to fundamental value. (1992)) and Underpricing. We observe a positive and significant relationship between price relative to fundamental value and equity market returns.
The estimated coefficient of 0.510 suggests that a one standard deviation increase in price relative to fundamental value increases abnormal equity returns by 0.71% (e.g., at its mean value, a reduction in abnormal returns from -2.9% to -2.2%). This suggests that underpricing is, indeed, costly for shareholders. As in Tables 3 and 4, all regressions are run with and without year fixed effects. Results are similar across both specifications. 18 In unreported analysis, we examined whether investor type plays a role in the equity price response to a bond issue. Meidan (2007) examines this question for a sample of PIPES. Using the share of proceeds bought by investor group i (hedge funds, mutual funds, pension/insurance companies, venture capitalists, education/family trusts, corporations, banks and broker/dealers) as explanatory variables, we find results that are consistent with Median (2007) . Investor type does not explain market reaction to the issue. Further, it is unrelated to underpricing.
The Underpricing Measure and Subsequent Price Convergence
Given the importance of the underpricing measure in the main analysis, we further pursue the question of whether the underpricing measure actually captures price relative to fundamental value. While the similarity of estimates with the estimates in Chan and Chen (2007) , in which the authors use two alternative pricing models, provides external validation, we provide an additional check using after-market data. For all issues in which we were able to obtain quote data in DataStream within one week of 30, 90, and 365 days post issuance, we calculate abnormal bond returns. We then calculate the correlation between this after-market return and the underpricing proxy. We expect that bonds that are priced lower relative to fundamental value to experience higher subsequent returns (i.e., price convergence).
Abnormal bond returns are defined as the change in price (accounting for coupons paid and accrued interest) from date of issue, minus the benchmark return. We define the benchmark return based on whether the bond is "equity-like" (conversion premium of 20 percent or less) or "debt-like" (conversion premium greater than 20 percent). For equity-like issues, the benchmark consists of 80 percent own-stock and 20 percent of the Lehman Corporate Bond Index. For debt-like issues, the benchmark consists of 40 percent own-stock and 60 percent of the Lehman Corporate Bond Index. 19 Table 6 shows the correlation between our underpricing measure and the bonds for which we were able to calculate abnormal returns. While the sample is very small relative to the full sample (ranging from 24 bonds to 220, depending on the return window), we observe a significantly negative relationship between price relative to fundamental value and subsequent returns. The correlation over the one year horizon is -0.16 and is statistically significant. That is, bonds that are more underpriced at issue have higher subsequent returns and do converge towards fundamental value. This provides market-based validation for the model implied pricing measure.
Strength of Placement Agent -Investor Relationships
Our main analysis uses a very simple measure to define the extent to which placement agents are able to sell bonds to past investors. We find significant repeated interaction between placement agents and investors. While the fraction of repeat investors in the sample ranges from 0 to 100 percent, most of the observations occur between the 90 to 100 percent range. In order to capture the intensity of the relationship between placement agents and their investors, and to induce more variation in the relationship measure, we examine an alternative definition of placement agent-investor links.
We 
where N is the number of investors in the bond issue. Strength has a mean of .186, median of .101 and interquartile range of 0.08 to 0.121. Table 7 contains results of analyses in which we repeat the regressions in the main analysis (Table 3) , but replace RepeatInvestors with the Strength measure. We find that the strength 20 While a very different setting from ours, Davis and Kim (2007) also examine relationship intensity measures.
Their study examines proxy voting by mutual funds with the goal of understanding whether there is a link between their voting patterns and other links between mutual funds and a firm. They examine both whether a relationship exists and its strength (fees from a given client).
of relationship improves bond pricing. Similar to the main results, this is consistent with the hypothesis that when a placement agent attracts important investors from her "rolodex,"
aggressive underpricing becomes less critical.
V. Conclusions
Our main findings reveal two previously undocumented (to our knowledge) frictions that impact the initial pricing of convertible bonds: search costs and aftermarket liquidity. We document a robust negative relationship between bond underpricing at issue and investors' prior participation in bond issues by the investment bank. We also find a strong negative relationship between bond underpricing and proxies for aftermarket liquidity. Somewhat surprisingly, we do not find evidence consistent with conflict of interest models, in which bankers reward favored investors with more underpriced issues. In extended analysis, we also find that investment banking fees are also lower when search costs are low. Taken together, these findings suggest that search frictions play a meaningful role in bond pricing and that intermediaries can add value through their repeated interactions with investors.
When we examine shareholder wealth effects, we find that equity price responses to Rule 144-A convertible bond issuance announcements are lower when bond are more underpriced.
This suggests that the search frictions that we identify impose costs to shareholders. U nderpricing is the percentage premium (discount) of the offering price over the fundamental value from the pricing model. The following variables are from Placement Tracker: GrossP roceeds is the proceeds, inclusive of fees; F ee is the fee paid to the placement agent as a fraction of proceeds; ConversionP remium is the premium of the conversion price to the issuer's stock price on the issue date; RepeatInvestors measures the relationship between the placement agent and investors in the deal and is defined as the fraction of investors that purchased another convertible bond from the same placement agent in the preceding twelve months; N umberInvestors are the number of investors in each deal; and HHI measures buyer power and is defined as the sum of squared fractions of the total proceeds purchased by each investor. CumulativeReturn is the issuer's equity return during the period beginning one day before and ending one day after the announcement of the bond issue. CAR is the CumulativeReturn minus the return to the CRSP value-weighted index. M arketCapitalization comes from CRSP and is the product of shares outstanding and share price, and DebtRatio is the COMPUSTAT book value of debt from the year preceding the offering divided by M arketCapitalization. N umAnalysts are the number of stock analysts in IBES producing annual earnings forecasts for the convertible bond issuer. M aturity is the time-to-maturity of bond i at the time of its issue. From Mergent FISD, we collect bond ratings. Several dummy variables control for ratings categories and take the value of unity when bond i fits in that category: B-rating, C-rating, Junk rating, and unrated. U nderpricing is the percentage premium (discount) of the offering price over the fundamental value from the pricing model. The following variables are from Placement Tracker: GrossP roceeds is the proceeds, inclusive of fees; F ee is the fee paid to the placement agent as a fraction of proceeds; RepeatInvestors measures the relationship between the placement agent and investors in the deal and is defined as the fraction of investors that purchased another convertible bond from the same placement agent in the preceding twelve months; N umInvestors are the number of investors in each deal; and HHI measures buyer power and is defined as the sum of squared fractions of the total proceeds purchased by each investor. CumulativeReturn (CR) is the issuer's equity return during the period beginning one day before and ending one day after the announcement of the bond issue. CAR is the CumulativeReturn minus the return to the CRSP value-weighted index. M arketCapitalization comes from CRSP and is the product of shares outstanding and share price, and DebtRatio is the COMPUSTAT book value of debt from the year preceding the offering divided by M arketCapitalization. N umAnalysts are the number of stock analysts in IBES producing annual earnings forecasts for the convertible bond issuer. M aturity is the time-to-maturity of bond i at the time of its issue. From Mergent FISD, we collect bond ratings.
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where U nderpricingi,t is the percentage premium (discount) of the offering price over the fundamental value from the pricing model; N umInvestorsi,t is the number of investors in the bond; RepeatInvestors is the fraction of the investors in bond i that also purchased a 144A bond from this placement agent in the preceding twelve calendar months. The control variables in vector Xi,t are: the bond rating, the natural log of gross proceeds, number of equity analysts in IBES producing annual earnings forecasts for firm i during year t − 1, and the underwriting fees (percentage of gross proceeds). Each variable is described in This table presents two stage least squares estimation results for the following simultaneously determined system of equations:
The where U nderpricingi,t is the percentage premium (discount) of the offering price over the fundamental value from the pricing model, and Strength captures mean fraction of 144A convertible bond issues that investors in this bond issue purchased from bond i's placement agent during the immedieately preceding year. The control variables in vector Xi,t are: the bond rating, the natural log of gross proceeds, number of equity analysts in IBES producing annual earnings forecasts for firm i during year t − 1, and the underwriting fees (percentage of gross proceeds). Each variable is described in 
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